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Abstract
This Essay assesses the achievement of restoring representative government and also consid-
ers whether this is enough given the changes that have occurred since last there was devolved
government in Northern Ireland. Finally, it examines those aspects of the Agreement that can be
developed in line with a view that the constitution should now be seen much less as a structure
of rule than a framework for rule within the wider task of democratizing democracy in the new
Northern Ireland.
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INTRODUCTION
The multi-party agreement, along with the agreement be-
tween the two governments, that was endorsed by an overwhelm-
ing majority of the population of Ireland-North and South-
promises the solution to one of the most chronic problems re-
maining within modern political history. The whole Peace
Deal-including the Agreements and the Northern Ireland Act
of 1998 (or "1998 Act") with its Assembly and Executive, as well
as hoped for progress on policing and decommissioning-pro-
vides a bare framework around which, it is hoped, a sophisti-
cated architecture of devolved government can be built. The
provision of even these foundations is a major achievement. It
would be churlish in the extreme to deny the scale of achieve-
ment or to denigrate the effort that has been expended in
achieving this breakthrough. However, it remains at least possi-
ble that while the search has been on for this great prize of re-
storing representative government, the game has moved on.
Perhaps the solution of devolved, self-government is no longer
going to answer all of the issues about democratizing and ensur-
ing participation in government in Northern Ireland. It may be
that in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, the processes of govern-
ance have changed and that now, the big issues facing society are
not those that can be resolved simply by accentuating the tradi-
tional structures of representative government. Having secured
the longed-for prize of a "moment of political agreement" solu-
tion that can be given institutional form, wider issues of legiti-
macy in a changed world may require us to think about re-
newing our ideas of democracy, perhaps through pursuing more
participatory structures and processes.
This Essay assesses the achievement of restoring representa-
tive government and also considers whether this is enough given
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the changes that have occurred since last there was devolved gov-
ernment in Northern Ireland. Finally, it examines those aspects
of the Agreement that can be developed in line with a view that
the constitution should now be seen much less as a structure of
rule than a framework for rule within the wider task of democratiz-
ing democracy in the new Northern Ireland.
I. RESTORING REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
The arrangements for restoring representative government
to Northern Ireland are a tribute to the ingenuity of traditional
constitutionalism in solving one of the most chronic problems of
constitutionalism. For a long time, it appeared anachronistic
that many of the long-standing problems of government and
self-determination, from South Africa to the former Eastern
bloc, seem to have' been brought to a resolution whereas the is-
sue of Northern Ireland has eluded solution. However, with the
settlement envisaged by the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, it now
appears that Ireland has finally caught up with most of the rest
of world. Just a few years before the start of the next millen-
nium, history in the North of Ireland can be judged to be, if not
over entirely, at least finally under some sort of control. The
sophisticated constitutional architecture of the Agreement and
the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 seems at last to have squared
many of the circles that proved intractable for so long. While
none of the political actors in Northern Ireland could be said to
have obtained exactly what they would wish for, both Unionists
and Loyalists, as well as Nationalists and most Republican fac-
tions, can be seen as getting enough to sustain them in the pres-
ent-with at least the possibility that longer term aims might be
met in the future. It is not, of course, a question of the British
Government suddenly getting the constitutional architecture
correct. It is rather a matter of the wider politics of agreement
coming together after so many years. Indeed, although the insti-
tutional design is to be commended for reflecting the hard-
sought moment of political agreement into structures with suffi-
cient consistency but enough flexibility to allow the politics on
the ground to influence some of their detail, it is not really any
more sophisticated a plan than in the past.
All the items that are traditionally on the constitutional
agenda have been addressed in the familiar way. Examination of
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past "solutions" shows that all have required something by way of
a guarantee on the issue of the status of Northern Ireland within
the United Kingdom. At the same time, past solutions have ac-
knowledged Nationalist demands that there be some recognition
at least of an all-Ireland dimension. Successive British Govern-
ments have seen the medium term solution as lying with a form
of devolved government, but have worked towards ensuring that
simple majoritarianism is ameliorated by a cross-community ele-
ment.' This approach has been maintained.
With regard to the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, this has
meant that, for example, the position of Northern Ireland within
the United Kingdom is addressed in section 1 through a re-work-
ing of the familiar "constitutional guarantee." The all-Ireland di-
mension is developed through the North/South Ministerial
Council, the six agreed cross-border bodies, and a British-Irish
Intergovernmental Council as well as a new British-Irish Council
made up of representatives from all over the British Isles. Famil-
iar requirements about the need for a cross-community element
are met by requirements in section 52(1) and section 54(2), that
these bodies have participation from both Unionists and Nation-
alists. The Assembly itself is to be drawn from both communities
with the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act of 1998 requiring that
proportional representation ("STV") be used. Assembly mem-
bers must register as Unionist, Nationalist, or Other to give ef-
fect to qualified voting procedure under section 4, where a vote
must attract the support of a majority of designated nationalists
and designated unionists, or the support of sixty percent, includ-
ing forty percent of each group voting. Section 42 allows thirty
or more members to make a petition of concern about any mat-
ter to be voted on by the Assembly, which then requires cross-
community support.
The Executive too is to share power. The more or less co-
equal First Minister and Deputy First Minister must stand for
election together. Section 16(3), requiring a majority from each
designated group, more or less ensures that in practice, there
will be representation from both communities. The ten Ministe-
1. SeeJ. MORISON & S. LIVINGSTONE, RESHAPING PUBLIC POWER: NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 103-10 (1995). This book provides a detailed
account of how each attempt at constitutional settlement has had to address four con-
flicting agenda items, which together map out the basic position dividing most of the
local politicians and describe the outer limits of British policy. Id.
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rial offices agreed, the maximum permitted by section 17 must
also be distributed proportionally. There are safeguards in sec-
tion 6 and in sections 75 and 76 about discrimination in legisla-
tive and executive action, in addition to the human rights and
equal opportunities provisions in Part VII of the act. What the
settlement produces is a very sophisticated model of representa-
tive government hedged around with cross-border bodies, a
Council of the Isles, and other features and add-ons to help in
the political task of reconciling the irreconcilable. Indeed, it is
very representative government that is produced, and it will exist
in large quantity. Northern Ireland is a very small place with a
large amount of government. A population of 1.63 million has
108 representatives in its local assembly. There is one represen-
tative for every 11,000 voters, which compares to one Westmin-
ster MP for every 60,000 or 70,000 voters in the United Kingdom
generally.2
In addition, Northern Ireland has the planned Civic Forum
established by paragraph 34 of Strand One of the Belfast Agree-
ment, as well as the eighteen members returned to the Westmin-
ster Parliament and the three Members of the European Parlia-
ment-a significant over-representation compared to the rest of
the United Kingdom-not to mention the twenty-six local coun-
cils, albeit discharging fairly limited functions.' The Assembly
has agreed upon no less than ten departments (all with a full
civil service complement) and six cross-border bodies. There
will be some reduction and redeployment within the direct rule
machinery, but it seems unlikely that many of the actual mecha-
nisms for service delivery will be made redundant by the new
Assembly.
Of course, there is little point in being parsimonious when
2. 809,917 votes were cast in the Northern Ireland election on May 30, 1998 from
68.9% of the total electorate. In total, this compromises a little more than 1.17 million.
In the Westminster election of 1997, the highest number of voters electing a member of
parliament was 101,680, and the lowest number was 22,983. See COLIN RALLINGS &
MICHAEL THRASHER, BRITAIN VOTES 6: BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS 1997
189-90 (1998). The Northern Ireland constituencies voting for Westminser members
contain electorates that are not too far from the average Great Britain constituency
numbers although, of course, this is in addition to the Assembly representation.
3. Estimated net spending for council in 1996-97 amounts to UKY219 million out
of a Northern Ireland expenditure budget of £8,009 million-approximately 2.73%.
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BRANCH), DISTRICT COUNCIL (NI) RATE STATISTICS TABLES (1996-97).
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peace is at stake. But even taking this into account, the North-
ern Ireland structures are extravagant.4 There seems to be a be-
lief that political reassurance can be achieved through structure.
A body or commission-with the chair being distributed to a
Unionist or Nationalist as is politically expedient-is the almost
automatic response to any issue. This has produced a new post-
agreement elite to be added to the already-existing quangocracy,
which carried out the business of government in the absence of
political representatives.
Thus, there is not only the 108 Assembly representatives
with their salaries of £36,000 plus expenses, and the various min-
isters and junior ministers drawn from their ranks, but also a
range of new figures who make up a new elite of Peace Process
functionaries. For example, there is the Police Ombudsman for
Northern Ireland who earns between £70,000 and £90,000 per
year and has a staff of sixty and a budget of £3million.' The costs
of these new Peace Process functionaries may be less (even if
measured only in material terms) than a huge security presence
and an ongoing conflict. However, in a relatively stagnant econ-
omy,6 where eighty percent of employees earn less than £23,000
per annum7 and one fifth of household income comes from so-
4. In South Africa, for example, the 1994 elections returned only 490 members (90
to an Upper House) from its population of 41.5 million with eleven official languages
who live in a territory of some 470,689 square miles.
5. See, e.g., Advertisement: Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (visited Apr. 14,
1999) <http://www.nio.gov.uk/981130z-nio.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal). It is interesting that by contrast the Human Rights Commissioner attracts
a salary of only £50,000 - £70,000. See, e.g., Information for Applicantsfor Appointment to the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http://
www.nio.gov.uk/981124j-nio.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
The Human Rights Commissioner has a budget of £750,000, which will sustain a very
much smaller staff. See, e.g., House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 317, July 27, 1998,
col. 66 (Mr. Murphy).
6. The gross national product ("GNP") has increased in recent years with the ef-
fect that Northern Ireland no longer attracts Objective 1 status as an area of particular
need within the European Union. Even so, its GDP is only 81% of the European aver-
age. SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998.
7. The average salary in Northern Ireland is £17,295, although 20% of the
workforce earn less than £9,000 and only 10% earn more than £28,000 per annum.
The salary levels of many of the new functionaries of peace will put them in the 2% of
those in Northern Ireland whose salary is in excess of £40,000. See, e.g., NORTHERN
IRELAND NEW EARNINGS SURvEY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, STATISTICS
RESEARCH BRANCH (April 1998).
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cial security benefits,8 such expenditure requires value for
money at the very least. There is no guarantee that services-
those issues of housing, education, jobs, and investment that ac-
tually matter most to the majority of people-are necessarily im-
proved by this byzantine structure. Indeed, the costs may well be
taken out of front-line service provision at some time in the fu-
ture. If they are not, there are serious questions to be asked
about fairness vis-;I-vis other citizens in the United Kingdom who
seem to get substantially less per head for their taxes.
The point here is not simply about the disproportionality of
the rewards given to an elite or the suspicion that in some cases
the process of keeping all parties on board is tantamount to brib-
ery or even about value for money from government. It is rather
about noting the fact that the Westminster system of representa-
tive government has been given full expression. There is now
the full realization of the policy that successive British Govern-
ments have pursued of searching for a political compromise that
could be crystallized into a constitutional structure for govern-
ment. No expense has been spared to provide the most devel-
oped possible mechanisms of government. The Northern Ire-
land structures represent the very acme of representative govern-
ment in the classic sense.
The only problem is that government in this classic sense
may well be an outdated concept. As shall be argued in the next
section, the processes of government in Northern Ireland, as
elsewhere, have changed radically in the intervening quarter of a
century since last there was a devolved administration in place.
It is rather as if a long-term prisoner were to emerge from the
Maze Prison after twenty-five years, satisfied that whatever long
struggle that he was part of has now been deemed to be over,
and expect that now things would return to what he had known
where he would be able to find ajob for life in the shipyard or in
engineering. Just as heavy industry has largely disappeared in
Northern Ireland, so too government, as it was in the 1970s, no
longer exists. Hopes that traditional structures and mechanisms
of representative government can by themselves resolve the com-
plex issues of public power are no more realistic than the re-
cruitment expectations of the unskilled ex-prisoner. The new
8. This is a higher proportion than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. See, e.g.,
OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, REGIONAL TRENDS, 32 (1997).
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Northern Ireland requires an understanding of how things have
changed and an imaginative and progressive response to the
challenges of change.
II. CHANGING GOVERNANCE
While successive British Secretaries of State, sometimes with
assistance from progressive forces from the Republic of Ireland,
the United States, and elsewhere, have been attempting to bro-
ker the historic deal that will restore an acceptable form of de-
volved government to Northern Ireland, the nature of the state
and the role of government in most of the developed world has
been undergoing seismic change. It is at least arguable that al-
most everywhere, the public sector no longer exists as a uniform
set of institutions. Instead, it has been fractured into a plethora
of different arrangements with little by way of common features
or unifying organizational principles.
This is a general process that affects Northern Ireland no
less than elsewhere. Arguably, however, Northern Ireland is dif-
ferent to begin with because it has a longer experience of alter-
native forms of governance and service delivery. The result is
that the mechanics of governance are much more complicated
than seems to be supposed. The idea of simply returning gov-
ernment to an Assembly where it can be administered as it was in
the 1970s is unrealistic.
Many of the factors fragmenting government are exper-
ienced almost everywhere. The end of the millennium is
marked by a whole range of contradictory elements and trends.
The state seems simultaneously too small for many big issues, yet
too large for local and personal concerns. These globalizing and
localizing trends challenge the idea of the state as the funda-
mental unit of politics. Further, they undermine the traditional
role of government as possessing a monopoly of public authority
within a defined territory.
The scope of government to act independently and effec-
tively is being reduced. At the same time, as the site of govern-
ment has shifted to levels above and below the nation state,
there has been a fundamental and on-going change in the way
that the remaining functions of government are discharged. In
the last decade and a half, much of the power that was once
wielded by government has been privatized, contracted out, or
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simply abandoned. This is true in the United Kingdom, North-
ern Ireland, and elsewhere. Almost everywhere, government is
seen as part of the problem, not the solution. The result is a
reduction of direct government involvement and responsibility
in the public sector. Rather than deepening the democratic
character of service delivery by accenting the politically-driven
structures of government, there is an almost universal trend to-
wards depoliticizing the public sector and undermining the idea
that the political process can produce public sector machinery
capable of delivering a full range of services.
The phenomenon is a complex one involving more than
just withdrawal by the state from activities that then fall to the
private sector, as with privatization in its strictest sense. There is
an on-going revolution in the public sector. Today, there are a
whole range of alternatives to the state in its strictest sense.
Often, these are premised on ideas of efficiency instead of in-
creased taxation, individual choice rather than state monopoly,
and on the state acting as an 'agent to empower a range of
smaller providers to compete and innovate rather than itself tak-
ing on all the details of guaranteeing and actually providing the
whole range of services.
In Northern Ireland, the transformation in public sector ar-
rangements is reasonably well-developed, if somewhat uneven.
Although, for example, there has been relatively little large-scale
privatization other than with the electricity industry, there has
been development in other ways. A project undertaken in 1995
by the Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom to investigate
the governmental arrangements in Northern Ireland9 found that
although the traditional devolved structures and their "tempo-
rary" replacements in the mechanisms of direct rule had
atrophied into a democratic deficit, there were many new (and
potentially more advanced) forms of governance emerging.
One of the most important forms of governance is the in-
volvement of the third sector in the processes of government. In
Northern Ireland, community and voluntary sector involvement
in government has thrived for reasons that may have to do with
organizations in these sectors engendering a greater degree of
9. See STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE &JOHN MORISON, IN PLACE OF FEAR: DEMOCRATIC AR-
RANGEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996), reprinted in FORTNIGHT EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
THE DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF NORTH IRELAND.
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legitimacy than the state itself in particular quarters. The Strategy
for the Support of the Voluntary Sector and for Community Development,
produced in 1993, stressed the importance of partnership ar-
rangements between the government and the voluntary sector
and acknowledged the role of community groups in helping to
formulate social policies-not least because of absence of any
political party structure that had developed beyond much be-
yond a lobbying mentality.
Such cooperation has a relatively long record in Northern
Ireland.' 0 Making Belfast Work was set up in 1987 and the
Londonderry Initiative in 1989. More recently, they were re-cast
with more emphasis on the role of voluntary and community sec-
tor. Since the early 1990s, the Department of Agriculture has
led rural development programs leading to the Rural Develop-
ment Council and local area-based rural regeneration strategy
groups. These partnership initiatives have been characterized as
maintaining an international dimension from their early days,
with the International Fund for Ireland being of importance
since its establishment in 1986.
The Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action has
maintained a European Unit, which lobbies for voluntary and
community sector. Most of all, however, the partnership ap-
proach has been encouraged by the District Partnerships initia-
tive established under the European Union's EU Special Sup-
port Programme for Peace and Reconciliation.11 Established be-
tween local councillors, the voluntary and community sector,
trade unions, business interests, and local statutory bodies, these
partnerships are funded by the Northern Ireland Partnership
Board, which administers the £49 million overall budget made
up from the EU Special Support Programme and matching gov-
ernment funds. The indications are that the Labor Government
remains committed to the development of a partnership ap-
proach. Indeed, the fact that the recently completed Compact
Between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in
10. As long ago as 1969, the government took the bold step of introducing the
Londonderry Development Commission and the Northern Ireland Community Rela-
tion Commission, although these welcome community initiatives were rather over-
whelmed by events.
11. See, e.g., THE NORTHERN IRELAND COUNCIL ON VOLUNTARY ACTION, PARTNERS
FOR PROGRESS: THE VOLUNTARY AND COMMUNITY SECTOR'S CONTRIBUTION TO PARTNER-
SHIP-BUILDING (1996).
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Northern Ireland12 was produced after consultation with some
5000 organizations operating within Northern Ireland shows the
scale of such community action and an acknowledgement of the
need for government to work with and through existing mecha-
nisms.
Historically, too, particular features in Northern Ireland
have resulted in other forms of depoliticized service delivery ex-
isting for longer than the present round of mainly en-
trepreneurial reform. The Macrory Report of 1970 identified
that many functions of government, even very basic ones such as
housing, education, industrial development, and the provision
of health care, were seen as political or even constitutional. The
main thrust of that report and successive government policy was
to remove these functions from the political process-at least
until satisfactory and fair representative arrangements could be
found. This led to the creation of many of those quangos and
other quasi-public bodies, such as the Housing Executive or the
Education and Library Boards, that took on functions of govern-
ment and now have an existence of their own such that it is un-
likely, even if it is technically possible, that their functions will be
returned directly to the new Assembly.
Quangos (more accurately termed non-departmental public
bodies), with both service delivery and advisory roles, are a par-
ticular feature of Northern Ireland. Arguably, they have been
present in Ireland since the last century. However, since the re-
organization of local government in the 1970s and the imposi-
tion of what, until recently, seemed like the state of permanent
impermanence that was direct rule, they have been resorted to
much more extensively than is the case in Great Britain. Func-
tions that are significant in terms of staff and resources, such as
health and housing, and wider planning and advisory roles, such
as industrial investment and economic planning, have long been
handed over to quangos.
This introduces familiar arguments about voluntarism, par-
ticipation, and the benefits of non-governmental expertise
against non-representation, patronage, and corruption. Such ar-
guments all have a particular and very important application in
the context of Northern Ireland, where non-partisanship in gov-
ernment traditionally has been particularly difficult to deliver
12. 1998. Cm. 4167.
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through the electoral system alone. In many ways, the system of
quango government has brought with it a sophisticated engage-
ment between state and civil society, as represented in the non-
departmental public bodies themselves, their sponsoring depart-
ments, and the other agencies as well as their client base. The
policy of ensuring (at least in theory) that membership of the
supervisory boards of many quangos includes Protestants and
Catholics, as well as representation from women and rural com-
munities, has produced a more balanced organization than
might be hoped for from simply majority politics. Quangos have
the possibility of extending membership to those who define
themselves by membership of secular, ethnic, and religions mi-
norities, as well as by having a different sexual orientation.
Quangos maintain their own accountability mechanisms. These
may be at least as good as those more direct techniques that per-
tain in straightforward representative government.
Techniques and best practices that are routinely used in
Northern Ireland include public auditors and financial report-
ing through published records. They also include requirements
to hold public meetings, to publish minutes, to admit the public
to meetings, and to consult, maintain, and follow codes of prac-
tice.13 It is inconceivable that trends existing everywhere else
will be reversed in Northern Ireland and that all the executive
functions exercised by these bodies will be returned to an Assem-
bly. The most that can be expected is that the Assembly will ex-
ercise a degree of democratic control. Whether or not this will be
an obvious and immediate improvement on existing mecha-
nisms remains to be seen.
While quangos have a history of operation in Northern Ire-
land, the more general hollowing-out of government, including
the reorganization of the civil service and contracting out initia-
tive, have arrived in Northern Ireland relatively later and without
some of the initial enthusiasm that marked their introduction in
Great Britain. However, since 1991, the principle of a split be-
tween purchaser and provider in the delivery of health services
has been established. Increasingly, the Health and Social Ser-
13. See ELIZABETH MEEHAN, "SMALLER PUBLIC BODIES" IN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT:
QUESTIONS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 167-81 (1998). This book examines the twenty-two
smaller executive bodies-thirty-six according to the CHIEF EXECUTIVES' FORUM DIREc-
TORY (1996). It also describes their accountability mechanisms and the relationships
that they live within.
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vice Boards are purchasing health and personal social services
from a range of directly managed units, newly-established Trusts,
GP fundholders, and private and voluntary sectors. The intro-
duction of the Deregulation and Contracting Out (Northern Ire-
land) Order of 1996 parallels legislation in Britain encouraging
a greater use of contracts. There is now a contract culture where
government, NHS trusts, and a whole range of other quangos,
along with the remains of local government, maintain a huge set
of rolling contracts with private sector suppliers for ancillary
services. The "Best Value" initiative introduced by the Labor
Government continues developments in this general direction.
In Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, the remaining machin-
ery of the state itself is being reorganized in a way that is deter-
mined by the package of ideas often referred to as the "new pub-
lic management." Generally, this involves replacing the old com-
mand and control structures of the Civil Service with flatter,
more focused structures that encourage entrepreneurial rather
than bureaucratic management and more flexible personnel re-
gimes. Essentially, the policy function in government is retained
by a very much smaller civil service establishment, while the de-
tails of service delivery are devolved to agencies at the outskirts
of government.
The changes that have occurred successively from the
Fulton Report in 1968 through the efficiency scrutinies between
1979 and 1987, the Top Management Programme, the Next
Steps initiative, and the Citizen's Charter have not necessarily
represented the attainment of a coherent plan. Together, how-
ever, they have taken public administration in a marked direc-
tion. All the changes contain an element of shrinking the core
functions of government and using departments as facilitators
rather than providers of services) 4 In Northern Ireland, there
are now a large number of executive agencies operating at all
levels and in all activities from the Prison Service to the Passport
Office.
The Department of the Environment ("DOE") can be taken
as a particular example indicating the scale and nature of the
14. The overall thrust is perhaps well-represented in THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER ON COMPETITIVENESS, 1995, Cm. 2867, which makes a virtue
of initiatives to cut "red tape" and to establish business links, including greater cus-
tomer focus, increased openness and accountability and, inevitably, a reduction in
costs.
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changes (and the reduced project of government that will be
devolved to the new structures in the 1998 Act). The DOE is the
largest of the departments whose functions are to be taken over
by the new Executive structures. It spends £1.2 billion and indi-
rectly employs 8500 people. It is the planning authority. It col-
lects rates and taxes, keeps public records, conserves and pro-
tects the natural and built heritage, provides water and sewage
services, and maintains the roads. It supports the work of the
Housing Executive, the only public sector housing authority,
and various housing associations. It is also responsible for trans-
port, including ports, bus services, and rail services, as well as
roads and fire services. However, the changes in establishment
are such that the DOE is now organized so that there are eleven
agencies involving some ninety percent of DOE staff.15
All of these agencies, like others existing throughout the
government in Northern Ireland, have the familiar structure
whereby there is a quasi-contractual framework document spell-
ing out the relationship 'between the agency and the Minister
within the department. This involves a somewhat problematic
division of labor, attempting to separate out policy setting, which
remains the job of the Department, from policy implementation,
which is the task of the agency. This distinction has been widely
criticized for being somewhat artificial.16 With an inexperienced
Assembly, there may well be additional dangers whereby profes-
sionalized agency staff may seek to exceed a strict definition of
their role. Alternatively, naive political ambition within the new
departments may result in an overestimation of the political role.
Of course, working out new relationships is all part of the demo-
cratic process. Even "teething" problems must be welcomed as
part of a return to normal politics.
However, issues of financial and political accountability re-
main, and these too may be problematic. Usually, within an
agency structure, the Chief Executive is the accounting officer.
As such, he is accountable, together with the departmental ac-
counting officer (usually the Permanent Secretary), for expendi-
15. Construction Service, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland, the
Driver and Vehicle Testing Agency, the Environment and Heritage Service, Land Regis-
ters of Northern Ireland, the Rate Collection Agency, the Roads Service, and the Water
Service.
16. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FOSTER & FRANCIS PLOWDEN, THE STATE UNDER STRESS
(1996) (focusing on chapter nine).
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ture. This can be maintained within the Assembly plan.
Although agency staff remain the employees of the Department,
they are not civil servants in the traditional sense. More impor-
tantly, although there is accountability to the National Audit Of-
fice and the Public Accounts Committee, there are difficulties
over ordinary parliamentary accountability with regard to the
distinction between operational and policy issues, with only the
latter being regarded as the proper subject of parliamentary or
Assembly interest.
Beyond the placid limits of the relatively ineffectual mecha-
nisms of traditional accountability as applied to these new cir-
cumstances, there are other possibilities. Some of these have
been working effectively and should not now be discarded. For
example, the agency will have a corporate and a business plan,
which may include performance targets and perhaps a charter
statement. There are, in addition, a number of other secondary
accountability mechanisms. It has been acknowledged that in-
formal, professional mechanisms of accountability are often the
most effective.17 There must be concerns about how an ambi-
tious Assembly will work with or against the grain of these other
mechanisms.
Overall, the introduction of the new Assembly brings many
challenges. There is no sense in which all the problems of gov-
ernance are solved simply by the existence of the longed-for
structures of representative democracy. The new agreed struc-
tures cannot wholly replace the complex alternatives that have
arisen both in response to the absence of a democratic alterna-
tive and as a reaction to more general trends. Indeed, the new
Assembly and its Executive may find its real competence to be
considerably less than that indicated formally by the Northern
Ireland Act of 1998. Rather than simply taking over legislative
competence as described in Part II of the act, the new Assembly
and its Executive will need to develop and negotiate new rela-
tionships with already existing mechanisms of governance that
will not disappear. The new government structures may find
their remit much more limited than expected. Although the re-
source framework will be set by the Assembly generally, it will be
determined by macro budget decisions in London. Further-
17. See TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE, THE NEXT STEPS INITIATIVE: SEV-
ENTH REPORT (Session 1990-1991).
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more, much of the UK£-9billion budget that technically is avail-
able to the Assembly will be pre-spent in the sense that commit-
ments to maintain existing services will diminish almost to ex-
tinction the freedom of the new Ministries and the Assembly to
make take new initiatives-at least where these cost money. Ex-
isting mechanisms of service delivery are unlikely to wither away.
Rather than seeking to replace them, the new Assembly and its
Executive must work alongside the host of different and dynamic
mechanisms from the private and voluntary sectors, as well as
from the restructured public sector that are now involved in ser-
vice delivery. The greatest contribution that the Assembly can
make in this context is to contribute towards varied and sophisti-
cated methods of accountability and control such as are appro-
priate for the complexity of modern governance. Just as it can-
not hope to take back all the levers of power and to control or
drive directly all the engines of service delivery, so the Assembly
must not attempt simply to substitute the sort of mechanisms of
accountability and control that might have been appropriate in
the 1970s. It is to this role, and the potential that is in the Agree-
ment for such post-modern democracy, that we now turn.
III. BUILDING PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT
The current agreement, however welcome, does not pro-
vide a final solution. Although the breakthrough has been made
whereby sufficient political agreement was brokered to allow the
creation of a structure for government, the struggle to equip
Northern Ireland with adequate mechanisms for governance in
the twenty-first century, with all the multi-level complexity that
this entails, is not complete. It would be unrealistic and un-
healthy to expect the settlement structures contained in the
1998 Act to carry out all the jobs of modern governance. The
whole project of government has changed so that the traditional
institutions of representative government can no longer account
for or sustain the complex processes and relationships that con-
stitute modern governance. It is unrealistic also in that it places
hopes and expectations on the institutions of representative de-
mocracy that are not being met elsewhere.
Traditional democracy is facing challenges of legitimacy
everywhere. As Anthony Giddens sees it, "[t] he crisis of democ-
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racy comes from its not being democratic enough."18 In North-
ern Ireland as elsewhere, we must address Giddens' challenge as
to how we can democratize democracy. It is not enough to point
to the sort of institutions of representative democracy that
Northern Ireland can now boast in common with almost every
other developed system. This can only be a beginning rather
than an end to the project of providing an open, democratic,
civic space where a constitutionalism of values, rather than one
merely of structures, can provide a framework for proper, mod-
ern, participatory governance.19
That is not to say that there is no role for a state bureaucracy
and that it is not worthwhile to institute the Assembly and its
related structures. The argument here is not that state or re-
gional government is dead or totally superseded. There will con-
tinue to be a role for some sort of state-run and state-funded
bureaucracy. Much of the structure suggested by the 1998 Act is
in keeping with wider ideas about devolution and about sub-
sidiarity for wider decision-taking."z Rather, the argument is sim-
ply that government is not now (if it ever really was) omni-com-
petent, and that there are more choices ahead after simply elect-
ing the representatives into the formal government structures.
Indeed, even within the limits of traditional, formal government
structures, the Assembly must accept that choices now present
themselves as to how in detail the state bureaucracy should con-
figure itself to take up its now more limited role.
Thus, there are political choices to be made between the
conservative call for a smaller state, the socialist demand for a
18. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
71 (1998).
19. A discussion of some the wider arguments of political philosophy that might
underpin claims that this is how politics ought to be organized can be found in John
Morison, The Case Against Constitutional Reform?, 25 J. L. & Soc'Y 510, 510-35 (1998).
20. Indeed, not withstanding arguments about self-determination and national in-
tegrity within the Irish context, an administration devolved to some local level is clearly
in line with trends elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The principle of subsidiarity too
suggests that the British-Irish Council Agreement, as given effect by Part V of the North-
ern Ireland Act 1998, may be an appropriate level for some of the issues about relations
within the British Isles to be dealt with within Strand Two. Relations with the European
Union are perhaps less satisfactorily handled within the scheme insofar as Schedule 2
seems to deny the possibility of any direct relationship between the Assembly and Brus-
sels, although paragraph 17 of Strand Two and paragraph 5 of Stand Three of the
Agreement encourage the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Coun-
cil respectively to have an EU dimension to their work.
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more responsive state, and more radical calls for a more empower-
ing state where real power is devolved to lower level organizations
and to citizens. Part of this choice involves deciding between an
enabling state and a contracting state. There is an element of
either/or, of political choice, that is manifested in the formats of
governance that are chosen. Not all of the new technology of
governance is as politically neutral as some commentators would
have us believe.21 The new institutions in Northern Ireland must
not only accept,the limits that now constrain the role of govern-
ments, but also decide how exactly they wish to discharge their
remaining more limited function.
However, beyond these important questions of real politics
that now face the Assembly, there are other equally important
issues about how a new constitutionalism of process, partner-
ship, and value can be developed to deal with the issues of wider
governance as they now operate beyond the formal institutions
of the Assembly and Executive. It is fortunate that there is al-
ready in place some existing governance structures and some
new features, particularly within Part VII of the Northern Ire-
land Act of 1998, which contain at least the potential for such a
constitutionalism to develop.
Such a constitutionalism will be much more indeterminate
and messy than the high constitutionalism of institution build-
ing. It will concentrate on recapturing and controlling the fugi-
tive power that has escaped from formal government to the pri-
vate and voluntary sectors or to quasi-public bodies and net-
works. This essentially public power must be subject to the
control that comes from applying basic democratic values. Thus,
constitutional values of transparency and openness must be ap-
plied to existing quangos, agencies, and partnerships.
21. For example, if we accept decentralization-one of the chief nostrums of the
new managerialism-it leaves us with a choice as to what sort of decentralization. De-
centralization via markets liberates both organizations and customers. Customers ex-
press choice in the market place as with parents choosing between schools. In contrast,
administrative decentralization does not seek to remove state involvement altogether
but rather to create more responsive bodies and agencies, which can better factor in
consumer and citizen preferences while at same time retaining control over political
strategy and service distribution. Political decentralization would seek to go further and
to promote "empowerment" by providing political structures where financial and deci-
sion making control is pushed down the organization and sometimes outwards to cli-
ents involving them in the operation of services. The Northern Ireland government
structures need to make these sort of choices about how to operate.
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The sort of reporting and accountability requirements that
some of these bodies undertake as an aspect of good practice
must be standardizd at their highest level. Performance indica-
tors that include not just private sector-style efficiency, but also
elements of democratic sufficiency must be devised and applied.
Impact assessments that look imaginatively beyond simple head-
counting towards real equality must be carried out, published,
and acted upon.
Closely rated to this control function, the new constitution-
alism must also accentuate participation within an expanded
public sphere beyond the formal institutions of government.
Consultation duties and equality criteria must be imposed. The
Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment 22 ("PAFT") model has par-
ticular application here. Inequalities in power and status ex-
isting along gender, class, race, and other lines must be recog-
nized and compensated for to maximize participation in all the
agencies, quangos, and networks that make up the public sphere
within the new and more complex conditions of governance to-
day. This may require the introduction of consultation require-
ments, vetoes, and conditions of minimum consensus, as well as
a range of special rights for particular groups and special duties
placed on parts of government.
Aspects of existing mechanisms, such as PAFT, the statutory
duty to promote equality of opportunity in section 75, the prohi-
bition of discrimination by public authorities in section 76 of the
Northern Ireland Act of 1998, and the Equality Commission,
22. According to the guidelines, "PAYT is concerned with securing equality of op-
portunity and equity of treatment regardless of religious belief, political opinion, gen-
der, marital status, having or not having a dependent, ethnicity, disability, age or sexual
orientation .... PAFTF is not confined to issues of legality but encompasses the wider
issues of fairness." Central Secretariat Circular, 5//93; see STANDING ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE, 1997, Cm.
3684. It operates (at least ideally) to mainstream equality norms at all levels of public
sector activity by requiring government in all forms to be aware of and responsive to a
wider agenda of equality. It has the potential to operate both at the level of contracts
with private sector suppliers and with a European dimension where, for example, the
EU's Special Support Programme has PAFT style commitments to ensure that partner-
ships between government, business, and the third sector funded under this pro-
gramme pursue an equality agenda. Id.; see MCCRUDDEN, MAINSTREAMING FAIRNESS? A
DISCUSSION PAPER ON POLICY APPRAISAL AND FAIR TREATMENT (1996). PAFT could pro-
vide a model for a very significant way of developing new normative, constitutional
mechanisms. See, e.g., TOM HADDEN ET AL., EQUAL BUT NOT SEPARATE (1998); cf. THE
WHITE PAPER ON PARTNERSHIP FOR EQUALITY, 1998, Cm. 3890.
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provide the raw material for developing controls on public
power, as well as the required mechanisms for potentially guar-
anteeing open, fair, and inclusive civic space. However, it is im-
portant that all aspects of Part VII of the 1998 Act, where the
human rights and equality agenda is addressed, are used imagi-
natively.
Human rights cannot be seen only as protections against an
almighty and overbearing state. While the history of human
rights in general, and indeed even human rights in Northern
Ireland in particular, might be regarded as a history of a struggle
to assert basic dignity and individual human autonomy against
an often oppressive state machine made up of police and prison
and government departments, the story in the present and fu-
ture is somewhat different. The equality provisions of the North-
ern Ireland Act of 1998 have the potential to establish the foun-
dations of a society where participation in a public civic space
can take place in conditions of real equality, and where unjust
differentials in power, from whatever source public or private,
can be addressed in an emancipatory project, which may have a
tremendous resonance world-wide. It is vital that the potential
of this constitutionalism be given as much emphasis as the more
eye-catching institution building.
CONCLUSION
While the political breakthrough that has led at last to the
possibility of stable political institutions of government is to be
given an unqualified welcome, it must be accompanied by a real-
ization that the whole project of government has changed radi-
cally since the search for a political solution began. In place of
the conditions that pertained even when devolved government
was last in place in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, there is now a
much more complex system of governance that brings in the pri-
vate and voluntary sectors, through both partnership and con-
tract, along with a fundamentally reordered public sector.
These changed times require that the sort of institutional
solution that is predicated within most of the settlement instru-
ments be augmented by a new constitutionalism of value and
process. Some elements of existing practice, along with some
aspects of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, do contain the po-
tential for developing such a constitutionalism of values that can
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both control the new forms of power, as they now exist beyond
the limits of formal government, and contribute towards creat-
ing the sort of open civic space where all voices can be heard in
participatory, consensus building projects.
The creation of such an enhanced public sphere, and the
widening and deepening of democracy that it involves, is of par-
ticular importance in developing and underwriting the institu-
tional solution that the Assembly and related structures provide.
Everywhere, representative democracy is experiencing the sort
of legitimacy problems that require it to think about ways of "re-
democratizing" itself. In Northern Ireland, there is not much of
a history to support an argument that the apparatuses and insti-
tutions of the state provide by themselves an open and equal
civic space. Indeed, these issues are too important to leave to
the caste of professional politicians who may be tempted towards
divided competencies and roles along sanitized sectarian lines-
as, arguably, is encouraged by the registration and power-shar-
ing features in section 4 and Part III of the 1998 Act.
While one may hope that the Assembly institutions referred
to Part V of the 1998 Act, particularly the Civic Forum Assembly,
can provide something more like a forum for normal politics as
it exists in Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland, at the same
time, it is important to realize that even such normal politics
does not now exhaust the democratic agenda. As it rediscovers
the normalcy of political argument and administration through
institutions of representative government, Northern Ireland has
the building blocks to construct simultaneously a new version of
constitutionalism that can support and augment traditional
mechanisms. It is fervently to be hoped that this opportunity will
be taken.
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